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Cognitive Invariants and Linguistic Variability: 
From Units to Utterance 
Stéphane Robert 
CNRS-LLACAN, Paris 
Introduction 
The question of diversity in linguistic representations is generally dealt with in 
terms of the categorization of meaningful units in different languages.i The 
purpose of this paper is firstly to show that this question must be approached 
differently at the level of the isolated units (lexemes or grammatical morphemes) 
and at utterance level, and secondly to define some of the mechanisms which 
connect these two levels. 
Languages show the greatest diversity in their meaningful units, not just 
because referential strategies (categorization and referential paths, see 1.1. 
below) are extremely variable, but also because there is a 'depth dimension' (see 
1.2.) to the meaning of individual terms which differs from one culture to 
another, and even from one speaker to another. In fact the mode of designation 
or the way in which access to reference is constructed by a linguistic unit 
('referential path') varies notably from one language to another, even when 
categorization is identical, i.e. for the same referent. Moreover, the represent-
ation assigned to a word fits into a complex network of formal and semantic 
relationships with other terms and also into a web of associations with physico-
cultural context ('word depth'). This network belongs to the semantics of the 
word. It is also very different across languages and even differs from one 
speaker to another. 
In language activity, virtual units undergo certain operations whereby they are 
incorporated into utterances. The overall meaning of an utterance and the 
meaning of the units it contains are involved in an ongoing process whereby 
meaning is constructed throughout the duration of the speech act. This process 
works by the creation of relationships which enable different levels to interact. 
At the utterance level, the relationship between thought and language can be 
apprehended in terms of 'projection' and 'dimensional conversion' (see 2.1. 
below). In speech activity, multidimensional thought has to undergo a 
linearization process by which it is projected onto the syntagmatic axis. This 
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process can be described as a dimensional conversion (and reduction) from the 
multidimensional space of thought onto the linear space of speech. In any natural 
language, the reduction of the dimensions of thought to the linearity of the 
utterance is made possible by a complex of relationships, between the units of 
meaning and the meaning of the utterance, and again, between the depth 
dimension of the words and the linearity of the utterance (see 2.3.). While 
language production is formally a sequence of units, the effect which their 
concatenation in the utterance has on meaning is, however, non-linear (see 3.). 
The ongoing construction of meaning within the utterance places linguistic 
categories in the role of tools available at the outset of a uniquely instantiated 
process, and therefore loosens their relationship to the categories of thought. 
Languages thus make use of different tools, but do so within the framework of a 
common process of meaning construction, much of which has yet to be 
elucidated. 
Variability of representations at the level  of the meaningful units 
It has long been clear that languages divide up the world in different ways 
through their vocabularies and grammatical categories.ii Thus the body, 
presumedly the most universal and immediate of realities, can for example be 
shown to be divided up into different referential units in different languages. 
Depending on the scale of reference,iii French jambe designates either the entire 
member (below the hip) or only the part below the knee, while Wolof tànk in the 
wider sense means the part below the knee, and in the narrower sense, the foot. 
Likewise, French uses "fingers of the feet" for English toes, while German has 
"hand shoes" (Handschuhe) for gloves. But there is more to the matter than this; 
different languages can also construct different 'referential paths' to reach the 
same object. 
Diversity of referential paths 
The way of naming a given body part can vary, e.g., the terms for the fingers can 
take quite different referential paths: in French, the index finger is the "one that 
shows, points", while in ancient Greek, it is the "one that licks" (likhanós).  
Each of these units thus refers to the same object, but gains access to reference in 
different ways. This distinction between 'meaning' and 'reference', which has 
been common since Frege,iv has been reformulated by several linguists in terms 
of 'referential path' (Corbin and Temple 1994: 9, also Langacker 1991a: 275 and 
1991b: 5, 45). The diversity of referential paths accounts for both interlinguistic 
variation and some differences between synonyms within a given language.v 
There is an essential property of language involved here. Words are only the 
'representatives' of representations (Culioli 1990: 22), and the way reference is 
accessed is always a construct. This construction takes place through a choice of 
certain properties of the object in order to designate it, hence the variability of 
referential path. Thus, in the case of names referring to fingers, Greek and 
French have chosen different functional properties of the index finger, and name 
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it according to what the most salient property is perceived to be. Thus in one 
case, this is its use for pointing, and in the other, its use for scraping. These 
choices of referential path are both motivated (the finger is named according to 
one of its properties) and arbitrary (only one property is chosen from among 
many possible ones). Lexical categorization here provides an example of how 
variation among languages can be neither stochastic nor strictly deterministic. 
While the meaning of a word must not be confused with its reference, neither 
can its semantic content be reduced to its referential path. The index finger is not 
simply the "one that points". The referential path is nothing more than the 
'typical property'vi around which the semantic content of the term is organized, 
i.e., the means of gaining access to the various representations assigned to the 
word. The various semantic values of a lexical item can thus be described as a 
network of specific values, organized in family-type relationships around a 
common schematic value (Lakoff 1987: 105, 460; Langacker 1991a: 279-87). 
This schematic relationship among the various assigned representations is what 
optimizes the referential power of language, and in particular, what enables a 
single word to refer to more than one object. To take an example in French, the 
expression un bleu can designate a beginner, a new recruit, a work suit, a cheese, 
or a bruise,vii all of which have, in different ways, the common property of 'being 
blue'. Polyreference is a correlate of linguistic motivation. Bleu, in each of its 
meanings, is however associated with different semantic fields, each with 
varying connotations. 
Language diversity and word depth 
Words call up representations which fit into a complex network of relationships. 
While most of these phenomena are well known, they do not seem to have been 
sufficiently modelized. This has led the author to refer elsewhere (Robert 1996: 
169-76) to this network as a third dimension of language, called the 'depth 
dimension of language' (l'épaisseur du langage), as an addition to the 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions.viii 
In the first instance, this dimension contains the referential value(s) of a term 
(e.g., the different meanings of French bleu), which are culturally coded and 
make up part of every speaker's common knowledge, or the 'hyperlanguage' in 
Auroux's (1995: 28) terms. But word depth cannot be reduced to a term's 
referential values. It includes the various associations linking words to their 
physico-cultural context, e.g., the referential universes of the various sorts of 
bleus, and also variable connotations (the diverse connotations separating the 
terms bleu and néophyte, or white as the color of mourning in Chinese and 
marriage in French, and so forth), background 'scenarios' (e.g., the various types 
of market relationships underlying terms referring to tradeix or, in the case of a 
bleu as a new recruit, the military context and the hierachy of army, etc. ). 
Language in this way sets up not just a network of relationships which are 
internal to the meaning content of any given term (such as metonymy, metaphor, 
schematicity, and extensionx), but also relations among terms, which can be 
supported by either meaning (synonymy, antonymy, etc.) or form. Thus, French 
pardon contains don "gift" (with a set of Judeo-Christian religious associations), 
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while the corresponding Greek verb suggests shared knowledge (syg-gignôskein 
"pardon", lit. "know with"). Such morphological relationships (whether or not 
they represent true etymological derivations) produce resonance-like phenomena 
among the terms in a language: formal resemblance leads to semantic 
relationships among the notions, connotations, and values associated with each 
one. Thus, Côtes du Nord et Côtes d'Armor are the (former and present) names 
of a single French province, which are quite different in their semantic depth: 
one is associated with the north (cold, gray) and the other with Armor or 
Armorica (incorporating both Celtic legend and a formal resemblance between 
Armor and Amor). 
The network of formal and semantic relationships among terms is made all 
the more complex by the fact that form and meaning do not change at identical 
rates. Thus, a French plombier ("plumber") is no longer a tradesman who repairs 
pipes made of plomb ("lead"); the depth dimension of the word (hence part of its 
meaning) has changed through its linkage to the history of the society in which it 
is used. Some linguistic relationships may nevertheless survive demotivation: the 
metonymy involved in using the word plume ("feather") in the sense of "pen" in 
French to denote a politician's speech writer is still active, even though writers 
no longer use feathers to write with. This complex and changing relationship 
between words and their meanings, between the history of form and the history 
of content, means that caution is always required in trying to capture cognitive 
representations through linguistic representations. 
Thus words exhibit resonance properties, i.e. have the ability to respond, as if 
by resonance, to the material and cultural context as well as to other words. 
These resonance phenomena, due to notional associations, vary widely from one 
language to another, according to the context and the overall lexicon of each 
one. The depth dimension provides meaning content to words and, to continue 
the acoustic metaphor, creates a wide variety of 'harmonics' to the fundamental 
furnished by the semantic structure of the individual term. The depth dimension 
is a complex region where linguistic facts are associated both with other 
linguistic facts and with extralinguistic factors. 
This is why word depth is not just language-specific but in the last analysis 
specific to each individual speaker, since individual experience also plays a part 
in building specific relationships among words. Thus the word grandmother, for 
example, is caught up in a web of variegated relationships, some of which are 
intersubjective, while others are strictly personal.xi For this writer, grand-mère in 
French naturally calls up the domain and structure of kinship relations, but also 
ideas of Little Red Riding-Hood, a brand of jams (Grand-Maman), her own 
grandmother's blue eyes, her grandmother's sister who had a home on the Côte 
d'Azur, hence the Mediterranean, and so forth. 
Clearly, this depth dimension is a functional property of human language. It 
plays a part both in the representational power of language and in the 
construction of the meaning of a term in utterances and in discourse. 
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From units to utterance: The dynamics of meaning 
We have been hitherto concerned with virtual units which can be stored in 
memory with their potential values. But units never appear alone in language 
activity; they are always part of an utterance, where meaning is constructed 
through a dynamic process. The units therefore undergo certain operations as 
they are incorporated into an utterance. The various kinds of relationships which 
are established in the course of the speech production create a contextual linkage 
which constrains how the meaning of the individual unit is to be interpreted and 
fits it into the overall design of the meaning of the utterance. 
Language and thought: Sequentiation and dimensional conversion 
The communication of a thought content in linguistic form, whether successful 
or not, requires the progressive dissipation of an initial indeterminacy of the 
discursive space between speaker and hearer. Before I start speaking, the 
addressee does not know what I want to say or even, most of the time, what I 
want to talk about: we have, as common reference ground, only the material 
situation we share. In order to be expressed linguistically, the thought content 
has to be progressively built up through the act of speech. Linguistic communic-
ation therefore proceeds from a kind of empty common referential space 
between interlocutors to an increasingly specified referential space. Language 
activity means eliminating indeterminacyxii in order to build up a referential 
space common to the participants. I have argued elsewhere (1996: 186-191) that 
this dissipation of indeterminacy takes place through a complex process which 
can be understood in terms of projection and dimensional reduction. In the 
speech act, the speaker has to project a multidimensional thought onto a linear 
axis and break it up into a sequence of discrete units. The physical properties of 
language (as sound produced over time) are such that verbal expression implies 
running thought through a specific code, which acts as a bottleneck. This 
projection of a multidimensional space onto a linear one takes the form of a 
dimensional conversion or reduction which is often a painful experience for the 
speaker, involving obliteration or deformation of the speaker's viewpoint: his 
words say less than he would like them to. 
The greatest difficulty for linguistic analysis surely lies in the structural 
feature of language, which requires that words with individual meaning be used 
sequentially to build up the overall meaning of an utterance, but without 
allowing the meaning of the whole to be reduced to the sum of the meaning of its 
parts. Formally speaking, morphemes are units which are ordered sequentially to 
make up an utterance; but semantically, words are not units of thought which can 
be added together to yield the meaning of the utterance. The complex interaction 
between two levels of meaning (the meaning of the units and the meaning of the 
utterance)xiii sets up a dynamic process which proceeds throughout the speech 
act. This non-additive manner of building up the meaning of the utterance is 
precisely what allows the dimensional reduction of thought to language (and the 
reverse operation of interpreting the speech of others). The reason why the 
construction of meaning is not additive is that firstly, words have their own 
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meanings and their own representational depth (the third dimension of 
language); and secondly, the utterance has structural features which shape 
meaning in non-linear ways. 
Contextual linkage: The ongoing construction of meaning within  
the utterance 
Using words in an utterance sets up a contextual linkage, creating in turn a frame 
of reference within which the potential semantic overload of the units (owing to 
their depth) and the initial indeterminacy of the utterance can be dealt with. This 
linkage activates one or another of the latent values for the given term and 
reduces its initial polysemy. Thus, in French terme can denote a word (as in 
terme technique "technical term") or a conclusion (as in mettre un terme à "put 
an end to"). It can also mean a mere temporal limit (au terme de sa vie "at the 
end of his life") or an outcome or qualitative limit (une grossesse arrivée à terme 
"a pregnancy come to term"). 
All contextual factors, whether lexical, syntactic, or pragmatic, play a part in 
building the meaning of a unit in the utterance. In the expression, terme 
juridique "legal term", for example, the connection between the meaning of the 
adjective and the meaning of the noun is responsible for assuring that terme is 
taken in the sense 'word'. In the plural, les termes, a fragmentationxiv is implied 
which makes it a count noun. But since words denoting a quality cannot be 
fragmented (*les blancheurs "whitenesses"), the use of the plural eliminates the 
qualitative interpretation of terme. Likewise, the verb arriver "arrive at, reach" 
in arriver à son terme "reach its end" is telic and implies a dynamic process 
heading towards an intended end, thereby immediately eliminating the sense 
'word', even when the preceding semantic context has to do with speech (e.g., 
son discours arrive à son terme "his speech is coming to an end"). The 
prototypical value of any term is thus more likely to be found in context-free or 
utterance-initial position.xv Linkage takes place continuously within the 
utterance, enabling a term to take two different values within a single sentence, 
as in the advertising slogan, au lieu de prendre1 votre voiture pour une 
remorque, prenez2 une remorque pour votre voiture "instead of taking your car 
for a trailer, take/get a trailer for/as a car". Word order and the objects assigned 
to the verb prendre/prenez "take" assure it will have the meaning "consider to 
be" in the first occurrence and "choose, buy" in the second. 
This linkage with the context is what makes communication possible: the 
depth dimension of the words is not constantly present in full. But the context 
does more than just filter semantic values, it creates its own. In French, gueule-
de-loup fanée "withered snapdragon", where the name of the flower is a 
compound literally meaning "wolf's mouth", the adjective retroactively converts 
the preceding expression from a genitive construction into a compound noun 
referring to a flower. 
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Ways of connecting depth and syntagmatic dimensions 
As we have seen, concatenation draws a guiding thread through the depth 
dimension of language, creating a semantic 'isotopic'xvi which orientates the 
meaning of any term towards an interpretation congruent with the semantic field 
established by what precedes it. Syntactic and semantic possibilities are 
restricted as the utterance proceeds, and the referential space becomes 
increasingly specific. This is why we often find ourselves able to anticipate the 
end of the utterance or to finish other people's sentences for them. The depth 
dimension of language nevertheless makes it possible to 'verbally hijack' the 
linearity of the utterance: the speaker can play on the different values of a 
polysemic term by setting up a set of concomitant isotopics. The activation of 
different isotopics in this way is the mainspring of most plays on words, much of 
poetry, and even the kind of explosive rhetoric so dear to politicians. A French 
deputy named André Santini, commenting on the falling opinion ratings of the 
prime minister, Alain Juppé, who had previously announced an intention to form 
a gouvernement ramassé, i.e., a "compact government" (with a smaller number 
of ministers) was quoted as sarcastically saying, il voulait un gouvernement 
ramassé, il l'a "he wanted a 'gouvernement ramassé' ("compact government " 
/"government that has fallen flat"), well now he's got one!". 
In this context a second meaning of ramassé is activated, namely the sense 
"fail, fall flat" assigned to the verb se ramasser in familiar speech, and referring 
here to the unfavorable polls. Two layers of meaning are thus formed within the 
utterance. Such layering is made possible by the twofold network of 
relationships among words: syntagmatic relations and relations in the depth 
dimension. 
The effects of this dual articulation of a single expression which brings the 
depth dimension into play are all the more powerful when they appear at the end 
of the utterance and 'retroact' on all that has come before. The activation of the 
second value then spreads its connotations over the entire utterance, i.e. along 
the web of relationships established in the depth dimension of the words. This 
can be seen in the remark made by an important figure in the French Socialist 
party, Laurent Fabius, concerning the reappearance of the defeated presidential 
candidate, Lionel Jospin, who had let it be understood that he would withdraw 
for a time from the political spotlight: en fait de traversée du désert, la traversée 
de Lionel Jospin a été celle d'un bac à sable "more than spending time in the 
wilderness (lit. crossing a desert), Lionel Jospin has been spending time in a 
theme park (lit. crossing a sandbox)", i.e., "he could not keep away very long". 
A semantic isotopic is set up by associating "desert" and "sand", and the 
utterance ostensibly compares the time required to "cross" them. But "sandbox" 
brings in an entire universe referring to children, and its connotations in the 
depth dimension are diffused throughout the rest of the utterance and 
retroactively associated with the politician. Here we see words used as time 
bombs to set off sudden associations of ideas. 
 STEPHANE ROBERT  
The utterance: Formal sequencing and non-linear semantic 
effects 
The utterance, then, has specific properties deriving from the connections 
between the semantic depth of words and its own sequential form. 
The role of depth in semantic time bombs 
Contextual linkage makes the information yet to come in a speech act more and 
more predictable,xvii but never entirely so. The guiding thread can always be 
broken. Unexpected information introduced at the end of an utterance can in this 
way have a surprise effect: the informational impact is made all the stronger by 
its arrival at an unexpected place, given the accumulated specifications created 
by contextual linkage. The dual network joining words both syntagmatically and 
through the depth dimension means that an unexpected word can shape meaning 
in a non-linear way. We have thus seen how semantic time bombs at the end of 
an utterance can have a retroactive effect by diffusing their connotations 
throughout the whole utterance. But the use of an unexpected term can also set 
up a syntactic isotopic with non-linear effects. 
This sort of reversal of the information curve is a mainspring of rhetoric, and 
also of advertising, as Grunig (1990: 115-45), from whom the following 
examples are taken, has shown. Many advertising slogans make their impact by 
allowing an unexpected term with a high informational value, owing to its 
improbability, to intrude into familiar expression. One example is the 
advertisement for "Dim" hosiery: en avril ne te découvre pas d'un Dim, based on 
an alliterative French proverb warning against the sudden return of cold weather 
in springtime, en avril ne te découvre pas d'un fil "in April, don't remove a stitch 
(of clothing)". A similar case is the advertisement for a brand of mineral water, 
aide-toi et Contrex t'aidera "help yourself and Contrex water will help you", 
suggesting the proverb aide-toi et Dieu t'aidera (lit."help yourself and God will 
help you", the English equivalent being "God helps those who help 
themselves"), i.e., fortune smiles on the enterprising. The 'verbal hijacking' only 
works when the original proverb is there to back up the slogan. Language depth 
thus makes resonance effects possible, not just among words but among 
utterances as well. The insertion of a single term ("Dim" or "Contrex") in the 
utterance has non-linear effects insofar as it activates two utterances, the actual 
slogan and the backgrounded proverb, thereby creating layers of meaning with 
semantic interaction between the two utterances. 
Intonation and other linguistic butterflies 
Returning to the emblematic example of chaos theory, we may say that 
utterances are like the weather: the tiniest change can affect the balance of the 
whole system. Intonation is one of those linguistic butterflies which can change 
the semantic climate merely by a beat of their wings. Thus, depending on the 
intonation, a simple sentence like he's coming can be an assertion, an assurance, 
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a question, or an exclamation of surprise. A change of intonation affects the 
meaning of the entire utterance. 
In more general terms, any phenomenon of scope acting within the utterance 
can be responsible for non-linear shaping of meaning. Thus, the syntactic scope 
of the adjective in our previous example of une gueule-de-loup fanée "a withered 
snapdragon", brings about the syntactic reorganization of the phrase, whence 
comes a major semantic readjustment. The scope of focus within the utterance is 
another factor with non-linear effects. A change in intonation, for example, can 
bring about a change of focus which has a radical effect on the meaning of the 
utterance. Thus a French sentence like ne l'achetez pas par pitié can have two 
completely opposite values, according to the scope of the negation with respect 
to the focus. One meaning would be "have pity and don't buy it". Another, 
however, would have the scope of the negative ne...pas extend beyond the verb 
achetez which it directly modifies, in which case the sense becomes "do not buy 
it for reasons of pity (but buy it just the same)". There are many such elements in 
language whose semantic effects extend beyond the syntactic head of their 
immediate construction. 
Utterance-modifying units  
The sequential organization of the utterance is crossed by a variety of transverse 
structures which are flattened out in the syntactic structure (Robert 1993, 1996: 
88-101). The informational structure and the organization of the utterance into 
topic and commentxviii are one of these. But the utterance has other modifiers on 
two different levels (Culioli 1978a, 1982) which account for as many types of 
structural organization within the utterance: the predicative level (where the 
predicative relationship is constructed) and the higher level of the speech act 
(where a predicative relationship is associated with a speaker and a set of 
time/place coordinates). The meaning of some morphemes is such that they bear 
on the whole predicative relationship in which they have a syntactic role. Thus, 
in French Jean est admirable de travailler ainsi "John is wonderful to work so 
(hard)", more idiomatically expressed as "it's wonderful of John to work so 
(hard)", the adjective admirable modifies the syntactic subject Jean, but it also 
expresses a judgment on the part of the agent of the speech act (i.e. the speaker 
or 'enunciator') concerning the predicative relationship <Jean, travailler> as a 
whole. 
This category of 'enunciative' morphemes, whose meaning bears on the 
utterance as a whole so that they affect meaning in a non-linear way, includes 
both evaluative terms (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1980) like the adjective admirable 
above and, more generally, the external modal markers which express the way in 
which the agent of the speech act (the 'enunciator') endorses the utterance, e.g., 
propositional modalities (affirmation, negation, question, command, wish, etc.), 
epistemic modalities, and evaluative modalities (Culioli 1978b). 
The concomitant activation of more than one level of modifying relationships 
is made possible by the fact that the meaning of words can function on each 
level. The morpheme I, for example, is associated with both the level of the 
speech act (since it refers to the speaker) and to the syntactic level (since it 
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designates the subject of the predicative relationship). Likewise, some members 
of any other morphosyntactic class may have both a syntactic function which 
connects them to another component of the predicative relationship and a role in 
expressing modifications which emanate from the agent of the speech act and 
bear on the utterance as a whole, e.g., verbs or adverbs expressing an epistemic 
modality: it seems he's forgotten, he's likely to come tomorrow; or evaluative 
adverbs such as: fortunately he's gone. 
The fact that meaning can be shaped in a non-linear way thus depends firstly 
on the complex articulation between the utterance and the depth dimension of 
words, and secondly, on the incorporation of terms into different levels of 
modification. The latter phenomenon is a consequence of the dimensional 
reduction to a linear axis imposed by the nature of language, so that all terms are 
required to enter into a sequential syntactic relationship, whatever the level at 
which the modifying relationship is established. Thus, in the course of the 
construction of the utterance, the insertion of any given element creates both 
semantic resonances and a reorganization of utterance structure which have non-
linear effects on the meaning of the utterance as a whole.  
Conclusion 
Languages vary widely in the way they assign representations to their units. The 
categorization set up by linguistic units undoubtedly plays an important part in 
memory storage and cognitive access to referents. 
In speech activity however, units are always incorporated into, and at the 
same time acted upon by a process of linearization of thought in an utterance. If 
we accept that the specific meaning of the units is built up in the course of the 
speech act, the problem of the relationship between thought and language 
(particularly the question of whether or not languages lock us into a way of 
representing reality) moves elsewhere: linguistic categories are only the tools 
available for the construction of a uniquely signifying utterance.xix Looked at 
from the utterance level, language diversity thus parallels language-internal 
variation (polysemy, synonymy, paraphrasexx). The nature of the process 
whereby meaning is constructed within the utterance implies that linguistic 
categorization must not be thought of as establishing set mental categories, but 
only as playing a part at a specific level in the construction of linguistic 
representations. Between language and thought, as between the utterance and its 
units, a process of construction intervenes with its concomitant adjustments, 
approximations, and occasional misfires. 
Furthermore, the ongoing construction of meaning within the utterance is 
characterized by the non-linear shaping of meaning. This is the result of the 
constant retroaction of the units upon one other, thus assuming the existence of 
'reentry-type' cognitive mechanisms in language activity, which will require 
further study.  
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i. I would like to thank Raymond Boyd and Steven Schaeffer for help in translating this paper. 
ii. See for example Boas (1911) and Whorf (1940), who reach different conclusions. 
iii. On variation of scale, see Langacker (1991a: 283). 
iv. Frege ([1892] 1971: 103) discusses the fact that the two expressions "Morning Star" and 
"Evening Star", which both denote the planet Venus, have the same referent but different 
meaning. 
v. Thus, as Corbin and Temple (1994: 10) have shown, French électrophone and tourne-disque 
have (or at least once had) the same referent, but differing referential paths. Electrophone 
describes how the sound is produced, whereas tourne-disque describes how the device 
works. Here, interlinguistic variation clearly parallels language-internal variation. 
vi. This is Culioli's (1990: 129) 'schematic form'. 
vii. For a detailed analysis of the differences between semantic and prereferential categories, see 
Corbin and Temple (1994), from whom this example is taken. 
viii. Word depth cannot be reduced to the paradigmatic dimension: a paradigm defines the classes 
of words which can be substituted for one another in a given syntactic function, but neither 
the representational depth of a term nor the semantic relationships between the members of 
the paradigm (synonymy, antonymy, metonymy, connotative variation, etc.). 
ix. See Fillmore (1982) on 'cognitive scenes' and 'semantic scenarios'; and Kerbrat-Orecchioni 
(1977) for a discussion of connotation. 
x. See Lakoff (1987: 91-115) and Langacker (1991b: 2-5, 266-78) for discussions of the ways 
in which the values of a given term can be organized into networks. 
xi. For this reason, the word depth is a third dimension but not a space such that it is 
homogenously filled. 
xii. This concept of Culioli (1982) can be related to Shannon's information theory. 
xiii. This particular relationship between the whole and its parts is what distinguishes language 
from music. 
xiv. This is what Culioli and others following him have called the discrete nature of count words 
(Culioli 1978c: 191; Franckel et al. 1988). 
xv. Indeed, the depth dimension of words is criss-crossed by different poles of reference (or 
'meaning attractors') which can attract interpretations. The prototype is only one of these. 
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Individuals also have personal meaning attractors: a linguist will tend to interpret the word 
instrumental out of context as a case name, while a musician will think first of his cello. 
What makes communication possible is that contextual reference points working as meaning 
attractors take priority over all others, although there may be interference at any time from 
other sources of attraction. 
xvi. The term is taken from Greimas (1966: 96), but has subsequently been redefined by various 
linguists. For a detailed analysis of the different kinds of isotopics, see Rastier (1987: 87-
141). 
xvii. In particular, see Givón's (1988) attempt at modelling connecting sentence structure and 
informational predictability of content. 
xviii. The Prague school, in establishing a functional view of the sentence and its informational 
structure, foreshadowed the general theory of information (for a historical view, see Firbas 
1974; also see Chafe 1994). 
xix. The various constraints imposed by individual languages at utterance level remain to be 
determined. Work undertaken by D. Slobin suggests there is an intermediate level of 
constraint between thought and utterance corresponding to what has been called 'dimensional 
conversion' above, and definable as 'thinking for speaking'. Distinctions involving aspect, 
voice, and noun modification, for example, constrain the speaker's linguistic representation 
of an event in different ways. But these distinctions "are not categories of thought in general 
but categories of thinking for speaking" (Slobin 1996: 91). 
xx. In particular, see Fuchs (1994).  
